Unclear bailout policy, underinvestment and calls for bankers' responsibility are some of the observations from the recent financial crisis. The paper explains underinvestment as an inefficient equilibrium. Under ambiguous bailout policy agents suffer from a lack of information with regards to the insolvency resolution methods. Beliefs of bankers regarding whether an insolvent bank is liquidated, may differ from those of depositors even if bankers and depositors possess absolutely symmetric information about the economy. It is shown that such an asymmetry in beliefs results in underinvestment if the investment climate is characterized by high aggregate risk. The paper suggests policy implications aimed at the reduction of anxiety of agents and at aligning their beliefs to restore efficiency.
Introduction
Despite unprecedented efforts of central banks to bail economies out of the recent financial crisis the revival is slow and banking systems around the world are reported not to channel the liquidity provided by central banks further to the real sector. Along with this breakage of the monetary transmission mechanism, the crisis leads to two other important observations: (1) regulations with regards to insolvency resolutions in banking (and non-banking) sectors have changed in major economies, and (2) there is a sharp increase in efforts to make bankers more responsible for the (negative) events in the banking sector. Although the two latter are meant to improve the soundness of the financial system and thus contribute to the smooth channelling of funds to the real sector, this is not the case. This paper suggests an explanation to this phenomenon and shows that an uncertainty (ambiguity) about the policy response to bank failures can be harmful in risky times, even if it does not produce adverse effects when macroeconomics risks are low.
Central Bankers often follow a policy of "constructive ambiguity", which means that the bailout policy is not announced ex-ante (Goodhart and Schoenmaker [1995] Santomero and Hoffman [1998] , Bennett [2001] provide empirical evidence). This is mostly justified by the objective of avoiding excessive risk-taking by banks (see a review by Enoch et al. [1997] ) or by social benefits (see Freixas [2000] for a costs-benefits analysis). Researchers address the issue of constructive ambiguity by assuming that banks may be bailed out with some probability, which is known to the public. In general, however, there is no reason to assume that this piece of information is available to the agents. Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] present one of the first models to encompass political ambiguity, in which they assume that the public forms rational expectations about the policy indicators on the basis of the historical path of signals.
However if the macroeconomic environment and/or regulation change, such a path of signals from the past can not be used in the expectation formation mechanism. In the models of Freixas [2000] and Shim [2006] bankers are supposed to know the probability of bailouts. If the policy of the regulator suddenly changes and there is no historical path of signals to estimate the "true" probability distribution, they would still form homogenous expectations (beliefs) about the policy outcomes and there will be no significant change in results (except for replacing objective expectations with subjective beliefs). Introducing depositors into the model makes the public heterogenous, which implies that beliefs may differ among agents and implications of this are in the focus of the current paper.
Though heterogeneity of beliefs is nowadays commonly accepted (Coval and Thakor, 2005 , even suggest a theory of banking based on different uncertainty attitudes of depositors and investors), at the time of writing the author is unaware of any empirical research explicitly studying beliefs of bankers and depositors with regards to regulators' bailout policies. As an implicit support for this, Dupont (2007) suggests that some bank runs are not driven by the information about the banks' investment quality but rather arise due to insufficient information about the regulatory system.
In the model below depositors are informed about the banks' investment and it is the lacking information about the regulation that drives the result.
For the purpose of tractability the model is kept simple. Depositors wish to invest their fixed endowment in a risky asset which dominates the risk-free one. However, they have no access to the market of the risky asset, which justifies the existence of banks in the economy. 4 Banks are assumed to be completely financed through
[uninsured] deposits. Banks act as the second group of decision-makers in the economy, whose investment decision is explicitly modelled. Finally, there exists a regulator which intervenes if banks are insolvent. As usual, the regulator maximizes social welfare, which in this paper's setting means selecting such an intervention policy that the whole endowment of depositors is invested through banks into the risky asset. Depositors and bankers are unaware of the policy of the regulator but are able to identify the set of policies that maximize social welfare. Since there is no unique solution to the regulator's optimization problem, depositors and bankers face ambiguity with regards to the regulator's policy.
This simple setting is powerful enough to capture both risk and ambiguity in one model. It is well known that an ambiguous environment can produce suboptimal outcomes. Yet in most studies ambiguity substitutes risk, whereas in the current model ambiguity and risk interplay. If macroeconomic risk is low, regulatory ambiguity does 4 It is not unusual to assume that banks have exclusive access to the superior investment technology. A classical explanation for that follows Benston and Smith [1976] , who derive the existence of banks through their role in transaction cost reduction. The model in the current paper is built upon a similar assumption that captures the general idea of incomplete market participation. The results would hold if the interactions are embedded into a framework with a more sophisticated raison d'être for banks. Section 6 of the paper provides a discussion of possible applications of the model to different settings, including delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984) and liquidity provision (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) frameworks. not produce adverse effects. When risks increase, ambiguous regulation can produce underinvestment since both bankers and depositors overestimate their possible losses and exhibit highly cautious behavior.
There exists some recent finance literature that takes a similar view on ambiguity as here. The study of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) is the closest to the current paper in that they consider a liquidity crisis and underinvestment that arises through the inability of investors to rely on past data in building expectations. An interesting feature in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) is that the aggregate probability distribution of liquidity shocks is known to agents and can be derived from the past data, however it is impossible to derive the probabilities with which each individual agent would be hit by a particular liquidity shock. Other authors like Easley and O'Hara (2009a) focus on price effects of ambiguity arising from agents' preferences. A review of the recent studies on ambiguity in finance can be found in Easley and O'Hara (2009b) .
Contrast to these studies, ambiguity in the current paper arises from the decision of the regulator and the multiplicity of optimal regulatory policies, which does not allow market participants to anticipate the action of the regulator.
This also leads to policy implications that are qualitatively different from the previous studies. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) , for example, derive that adverse outcomes of ambiguity can be avoided if central banks credibly commit to provide agents with liquidity if the worst scenario is realized. Easley and O'Hara (2009a) come to a similar conclusion that a regulatory intervention should be conditioned on the realization of the worst scenario: this reduces the anxiety of agents. Importantly, these studies assume ambiguity aversion or pessimistic agents who overweight the worst outcome. On the technical side, in the current paper agents can exhibit optimism as well as pessimism, which makes the results applicable to a more general case than only pessimistic agents.
On the qualitative side, there are two main conclusions. First, an ambiguous policy can produce different effects in economies with high and low aggregate risk.
Second, optimal policy design here aims rather at the alignment of expectations of the heterogenous public than at the improvement of the worst case for each agent.
Conditioning interventions on the realization of macroeconomic events is a convenient tool for this. This novel effect of the macroeconomic conditioning is due to the fact that, like in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) , there is no ambiguity about the aggregate macroeconomy (which still can be risky) and macroeconomic indicators can be used as an objective publicly observed randomizer that aligns expectations about the regulatory interventions.
The rest of the paper explores the above ideas formally. Section 2 introduces the economic environment which is risky but not ambiguous. In a risky environment, it is possible that banks are insolvent, therefore insolvency resolution is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 determines the market equilibrium and demonstrates multiplicity of regulatory policies that maximize social welfare, which generates ambiguity about the choice of the regulator. Section 5 studies beliefs of agents and the market equilibrium under ambiguity about the regulatory policy. Policy implications and possible extensions of the model are discussed in Section 6. The paper concludes with a summary of results.
The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of risk-neutral agents distributed at [0; 1]
and two types of financial assets, one risky 5 and one risk-free. The model describes two periods: in the first period decisions and investments are made, and in the second period a state of nature s ∈ {H, L} is realized and investment gains reaped. Each household is endowed with one unit of wealth in the beginning of the first period.
Markets
The markets of both risky and risk-free assets are characterized by an absolutely elastic supply of assets. The risky asset yields a gross rate of return of r s in state of nature s, the risk-free asset yields r F in each state of nature. The probability of state s = H is p, and the probability of state s = L is 1 − p. It is assumed that
and
Short sales are not allowed, hence the amount invested in financial assets is nonnegative. Assumptions A-1 and A-2 guarantee that a financial portfolio of a risk-neutral agent would only contain the risky asset. Since the supply of the asset is perfectly elastic, market equilibrium would result in the allocation of funds entirely in the risky asset.
Since this is the reference point for the analysis, the regulatory policy would be aimed at the provision of this risky allocation of funds. At the first glance, this somewhat contradicts the logic of the banking regulation, which is mostly aimed at the reduction of risks. However, productive investment is usually associated with higher risks than unproductive allocation of funds, and thus a regulatory policy that would 5 It may be convenient to think of the risky asset as of an investment project like a production technology, which yields different outcomes in two different states of nature. Figure 1 . Sequence of events result in a safe allocation of funds is not realistic either.
6 Such a policy of supporting risky investment can also be found in the recent financial crisis (e.g. governments had to intervene to prevent a sharp fall in mortgage lending, which banks considered a highly risky investment.) The current paper focuses on such episodes when risky investment is economically optimal and thus a regulatory policy that aims at the provision of such an optimal risky outcome is natural in this setting. 
Banks
Assume, transaction costs prevent agents from entering the market for the risky asset. They still have an access to the market of the risk-free asset. Transaction costs justify the existence of banks, which offer a deposit contract with a duration of one period and without a premature withdrawal option. The banking sector is assumed to be of a unit size, perfectly competitive and homogenous. Banks belong to a small part of agents, who manage banks and are called bankers.
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The sequence of interactions between banks and depositors is shown in Fig. 1 .
In the first period, three actions take place: first, banks are created, then deposits are collected and, finally, banks invest. In the beginning of the second period, the state of nature is realized. Other three actions take place in the second period: first, banks reap portfolio gains, then deposits are repaid, and the banks are closed. The economy terminates at the end of the second period.
There exists also a regulatory authority (regulator), which chooses in the first period to either liquidate or bail out insolvent banks. The term "liquidation" is used to describe the insolvency resolution, as opposed to the duly closure of each bank at the end of the second period, when the economy terminates.
Insolvency Resolution
In the first period, banks collect deposits in the amount of D and invest them in a portfolio with share x of the risky asset and share (1 − x) of the risk-free one. In the second period, if the state of nature s ∈ {H, L} is realized, the value V s of a bank is
per unit of the initial deposit and thus faces the state-contingent rate of return xr
If the insolvent bank is bailed out, the regulator injects liquidity in the amount of
and depositors are repaid in full. The payoff of bankers in the liquidation case is hence
and in the bailout case it is
If the costs internalization is symmetric, λ = µ, the payoff of bankers if liquidated is the same as if bailed out, and as a result, bankers' choice does not depend on the regulatory policy. The asymmetric case can serve as a metaphor for other distortions in the decision-making by bankers, which can be caused by the regulatory policy. If λ = µ = 1, we obtain complete internalization of costs by bankers, which corresponds to "unlimited liability". 11 If λ = µ = 0, bankers enjoy limited liability. To rule out the limited liability effects, we assume from this point that λ, µ > 0.
No moral hazard issues arise here as no asymmetry of information is assumed.
If bankers wish to collect deposits and declare bankruptcy after reaping the investment gains, the proceeds of the investment are fully verifiable and the above described insolvency resolution procedure presumes that they are used to repay to depositors.
Therefore bankers have no incentives to declare themselves insolvent. Furthermore, portfolio selection is costless and does not require any [potentially unverifiable] efforts.
With regards to unfair pricing, positive penalties ensure that bankers have no incentives to establish excessively high interest rate on deposit. Although constructive ambiguity cannot be justified here through moral hazard, it will arise in the next section as multiple optima of the social welfare function.
The focus on bailouts and liquidations is mainly due to the simple setting of the model which however suffices to demonstrate the effects of political ambiguity. In general we only need to require that the regulator has several policy options which might have asymmetric effects on the public. As we will see below, the result does not require that λ = µ. To obtain the inefficiency result in Section 5 it will suffice that the policy options available to the regulator create asymmetric outcomes at least for one group of agents. Bailouts and liquidations capture this property.
Optimal Bailouts
In this section, we derive the optimal bailout policy of the regulator. As usual, the regulator maximizes social welfare. Since the public strictly prefers the risky asset to the risk-free one (see Section 2), the public is better off if the total endowment of depositors is invested in the risky asset. Therefore, the Regulator chooses the probability of bailout to ensure that in the resulting equilibrium (1) agents deposit their entire endowment with banks, and (2) bank portfolios consist entirely of the risky asset.
In period 1, the Regulator decides upon bailout probability z. This section studies the effect of z on the equilibrium by assuming that depositors and bankers are aware of z.
Households
Households decide upon the composition of their portfolio with share a of deposits and (1 − a) of the safe asset and search for max
gains of households: Since there is a unit mass continuum of households possessing a unit endowment, a solution of the individual optimization problem above determines the aggregate supply of deposits:
Solving for a * is straightforward due to the linearity of G e in a: depositors place their entire endowment as deposits with banks, as soon as the expected return from depositing is higher than the risk-free rate of interest. If the expected deposit payoff equals to the risk-free return, households are assumed to invest in the deposit contract.
This assumption simplifies the exposition. A possible interpretation of it could be infinitesimal transaction costs, induced by a purchase of the risk-free asset. From the straightforward solution of the optimization problem it follows that for a given probability of bailouts z, aggregate deposit supply is given by
with r
Note that the demand for deposits depends on the deposit interest rate r D and on the financial quality of the bank x, and is parametrized on the bailout policy z.
x r F − r L represents the interest margin, which depositors require in order to switch from risk-free assets to deposits. It is distinct from the risk premium, which is zero since agents are risk-neutral.
Banks
In period 1, each bank decides upon its portfolio composition x and the amount of deposits D to be collected. The banks are aware of two possible actions of the Regulator: bailout with probability z, and liquidation with probability 1 − z. The state contingent payoff of banks is conditioned on the state of nature s and on the action of the regulator and discussed in Section 3. The expected payoff function of bankers takes the following form:
The first two terms correspond to the expected profit of banks under limited liability. The third and fourth terms stand for the costs internalization. Note that with no internalization, the probability of bailout would vanish from the expected payoff of banks.
Each bank seeks for max 
Note that in a banking sector of a unit size, D d above describes the aggregate demand for deposits.
Equilibrium and Optimal Bailout Rule
Now we need to define the deposit market equilibrium and find the optimal bailout policy. If we denote with X * equilibrium aggregate investment in the risky asset, and with D * -equilibrium aggregate amount of deposits, then the optimal policy of the regulator is the one, for which X * = D * = 1 as this allocation maximizes social welfare:
for risk neutral depositors utility is higher when the whole endowment is invested in the risky asset.
Definition 1 For a given bailout policy z, competitive equilibrium is the allocation of funds (X * , D * ) and the interest rate r D c , which provides
The definition of equilibrium requires that deposit supply equals deposit demand.
Note that equilibrium is parametrized on the bailout policy of the regulator. The portfolio choice x * by banks is uniquely determined by the equilibrium interest rate r D c and the regulator's choice of z. Given x * and D * , the equilibrium investment in the risky asset is determined by X * = x * D * .
Proposition 1
The competitive equilibrium is:
The proposition straightforwardly follows from equating deposit supply and demand functions (7 and 11). 
It is easy to check that z < 1. section studies the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation if bankers and depositors make decisions under ambiguity.
Ambiguous Bailouts
Assume the regulator does not commit to any bailout rule. Without loss of generality we consider the range of potentially optimal bailout policies z ∈ [z; 1], and substitute for z = 0 wherever λ <
. Uncertainty about the regulatory policy induces uncertainty about the payoff structure in the model. Note that the analysis above does include uncertainty in form of a possible mixed strategy of the regulator, i.e. a stochastic bailout-liquidation rule. Now it is assumed that depositors and bankers possess less information than before, but still are symmetrically informed about the economy. To be precise, depositors and bankers are informed about the following: (1) the set of players in the economy, (2) set of strategies of each player, and (3) payoff functions of all players. Payoff functions are stochastic and determined by the realization of the random variable s, which determines the state of nature, and consequently, the realization of the return of the risky asset. 13 As shown above, under uncertainty in terms of stochasticity (Arrovian uncertainty) the equilibrium allocation is efficient, if the bailout policy is chosen from a suitable range. Ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) is distinct from stochasticity.
Nature of Ambiguity and Decision-making
Under assumption of rationality, agents should be able to predict, which policy the regulator chooses, if they know the payoff function of the latter. Since it was assumed that the objective of the regulator is to provide for efficiency of the equilibrium allocation, both depositors and bankers can identify that this objective can be achieved through any policy in the range z ∈ [z; 1]. There is no reason, why both depositors and bankers should count for the same probability of bailouts. Clearly, depositors and bankers operate under uncertainty, which is represented by a continuum of probability distributions over the regulatory policy. This kind of uncertainty is a special case of ambiguity.
One of the relevant concepts for decisions under ambiguity is the notion of pessimism and optimism. Wakker [2001] defines optimism and pessimism on the basis of choices, which agents would make, if their actions lead to different outcomes in different states of the world, probabilities of which are unknown. For example, if households in the current paper have access to the market of the risky asset, but are not aware of the probability distribution p, they would also face ambiguity. Knowing that two states of nature are possible, they might prefer to invest in the risky asset (which corresponds to optimism) or to invest in the risk-free asset (which corresponds to pessimism). The reason for that is that for an optimist, the best possible outcome overweighs the worst one, and for a pessimist the opposite is true.
14 There are several ways to capture optimism and pessimism in the decisionmaking. 15 Same agents can exhibit both optimistic and pessimistic behaviors in different situations or even take into account both best and worst outcomes in their 14 Gneezy et al. (2006) provide a paradoxical experimental evidence that a lottery over the best and the worst may be valued significantly lower than the worst outcome itself. Decisions under ambiguity, as described in the text, are not related to such behavioral effects. 15 Chateauneuf et al. (2007) introduce non-extreme outcome additive capacities (neo-additive capacities) to represent the CEU as a weighted sum of the EU-term, a pessimistic term, and an optimistic term. Simple capacities (see, e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey, 2000) also capture the same possibility. In order to disentangle effects of ambiguity from other effects we take the extreme form of beliefs and only count for optimistic and pessimistic terms. It is worth stressing that pessimism and optimism in this paper represent a decision-making model under uncertainty, contrast to behavioural deviations in decision-making under risk, which could be also captured by the above mentioned neo-additive capacities.
decisions. To study the effect of the risky environment on the equilibrium outcome under ambiguity, we assume that agents weigh best and worst. If we denote the degree of pessimism with α, then depositors maximize the following functional:
with G e (z) denoting the expected gains of depositors (5) for a given bailout policy z.
We can also interpret α as the fraction of depositors that exhibits pessimistic behavior and 1 − α as the optimistic fraction. The above functional then represents an average depositor. This interpretation is convenient as it generalizes the results for the case of heterogeneous depositors.
The first term in (14) corresponds to pessimism and counts for the worst outcome, and the second term corresponds to optimism and counts for the best outcome.
Extreme pessimism corresponds to α = 1. The ambiguity itself is captured by the fact that bailouts may follow any probability distribution z ∈ [z; 1]. More generally, z ∈ ∆ z ⊆ [0; 1] with ∆ z capturing the degree to which agents are informed about the regulatory policy. If ∆ z = { z} then (14) turns into G e ( z), and we obtain the above discussed case without ambiguity.
Differentiating (5) with respect to z yields
> 0 in all other cases. Therefore, the worst expected outcome for depositors is associated with liquidation of banks: min 
Note that technically (15) repeats (5) if we replace z with 1 − α (1 − z).
We can do the same exercise for banks, by replacing G e (z) in functional (14) with expected payoff of bankers Π e (z) from (9). Assume that the degree of pessimism of bankers is given by β, which is not necessarily equal to α. Again, we need to identify, what is the worst outcome for bankers, who internalize bailout costs:
For positive values of D we obtain 
Terms Π e (1) and Π e (z) differ only with regards to the internalization of bailout/liquidation costs. Denote
Functional (16) takes now the form
which technically repeats (9) where zµ + (1 − z) λ replaces θ.
Note that similarity between (15) and (5) as well as between (18) and (9) is only technical and does not arise through substitution of z with some perceived probability of bailouts. The latter would be the case if we consider asymmetric information leading to different degenerated priors ∆ z = { z} for depositors and bankers or if we assume that decisions of bankers and depositors are behaviorally biased. Instead, the information is symmetric, and both face the same prior ∆ z = [z; 1] for the bailout policy. Even more, depositors and bankers treat the missing information in the same way, and as a special case we can obtain equal degrees of pessimism α = β. It is the combination of the degree of optimism/pessimism and the worst/best outcomes that technically replaces z in the objective functions.
Equilibrium under Ambiguity
As noticed above, technically the objective function of depositors (15) under ambiguous bailout policy repeats their objective function (5) with z := 1 − α (1 − z).
Their optimization problem is the same as before. To determine the supply of deposits, it suffices to substitute for z := 1 − α (1 − z) in (7):
The same applies to banks. To determine their optimal choice, it suffices to substitute for zµ + (1 − z) λ := θ in (11):
We can define an equilibrium in a similar way as before:
Definition 2 For given degrees of pessimism α and β, the equilibrium under ambiguity is the allocation of funds (X * , D * ) and the interest rate r D a , which provide
and a * maximizes α · min
Note that the equilibrium is not anymore parametrized on the bailout policy, since the latter is not announced. Instead, the equilibrium is parametrized on the degree of pessimism of the agents. The following proposition establishes that the economy can settle in an inefficient equilibrium if the macroeconomic environment is too risky;
otherwise constructive ambiguity does not produce adverse effects:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium under ambiguity is given by: 
r H −r L characterizes the investment climate in the economy: it relates risk, pessimism and rates of return. Figure 3 highlights the intuition behind the proposition, assuming α = θ = 1 and z = 0. Competitive banks choose x * = 1 and set the deposit rate so that their expected profit is zero. If D > 0, this implies deposit interest rate of pr H + (1 − p) r L , which should exceed or be equal to the
fact, inefficient equilibria appear because bankers exhibit cautious behavior and avoid acquiring deposits at high interest rates. At the same time, pessimistic depositors exhibit cautious behavior as well, and avoid depositing at interest rates which make the expected return on deposits lower than the risk-free rate. 16 It is important that bankers do not need to exhibit pessimism or optimism (which is the case if µ = λ): the equilibrium can be inefficient due to the cautious behavior of depositors solely. 
r F −r L , which intersects the axes in points
r H −r L > 1 (both are above unity due to Assumption A-2). For some given level of θ, the dotted area in the picture represents inefficient equilibria. Threshold θ represents the highest level of θ which precludes existence of inefficient equilibria even for highest possible degree of pessimism of depositors and the 16 The expected return as given by the probability of the states of nature, not by the bailout policy. 17 In the latter case depositors may be heterogeneous but don't need to. toughest possible liquidation policy, i.e. for α (1 − z) = 1:
Inefficient equilibria can only appear if θ > θ, which implies that the necessary condition for them to appear is
Recalling that the risky project is characterized by an expected return of r = pr H + (1 − p) r L and by a variance of
yields the following interpretation of the necessary condition for inefficiency of equilibria:
According to (22), an ambiguous bailout policy is more likely to lead to the inefficiency of financial intermediation in economies with relatively high investment risk. On the contrary, if the investment risk is relatively low (σ
then ambiguity in the bailout policy does not have any effect on the efficiency of equilibrium, for any uncertainty attitude of the public.
Recall that objective functions of depositors (15) 
λ depending on which of the policy options brings higher penalties to bankers, or into µ = λ > θ in the case of symmetric penalties. Recall that θ is fully described by the macroeconomic parameters such as risk and expected return of the risky asset as well as the risk-free rate of return. Thus the regulator can avoid inefficient outcome by reducing the penalties imposed on bankers below the threshold value given by macroeconomic conditions. If the regulator wishes to maintain asymmetric penalty effects of the two policy options then the degree of bankers' pessimism/optimism β should also be taken into account.
Both µ and λ can be reduced to ensure efficiency. Reducing the higher of the two measures µ and λ shrinks the inefficiency intervals above and thus makes it easier for the regulator to ensure efficiency for any β. By reducing the lower one the regulator can abandon the inefficiency interval straightforwardly. None of these actions will preclude depositors' cautious behavior but they will reduce the anxiety of bankers who will go for a higher interest rate demanded by depositors.
A completely different policy implication relies on the ability of the regulator to align the beliefs of the public instead of reducing their anxiety. If the regulator can credibly commit to either of the policy options then inefficiency never occurs. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there can be reasons that make such a commitment undesirable, in which case the regulator would prefer some mix of the two options. The question is therefore whether some non-degenerate probability distribution z can be credibly communicated to the public. If this is possible then public beliefs are homogenous and Proposition 1 guarantees an efficient allocation of resources in equilibrium.
If the regulator can use an external publicly observed randomizer than the problem is solved.
The conclusions of the model seem robust to the definition of banks and the role they play. A more sophisticated justification of banks would appear if asymmetric information is introduced into the model, and banks act as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984) . This could be done by assuming that there are many borrowers i who all have access to identical risky production technology described by p, r (1) bank failures should be costly to create incentives for bankers to monitor properly, and (2) restrictions on diversification would reduce the efficiency of monitoring cost reduction (Diamond, 1996) . Again, the role of the regulator in application to the model above consists in the determination of a clear insolvency resolution rule and penalties for bankers.
To provide an additional reason for the bailout policy, a framework with bank runs could be used. This would require a complete reformulation of the model. In the bank run model of Diamond and Dybvig [1983] , the liquidity provision role of banks arises because the system of available financial markets is incomplete, and banks create a market that allows agents to insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (the incomplete markets setting complements the incomplete participation setting that is used in the current paper). However, patient depositors have incentives to mimic impatient depositors and withdraw their funds early, if they expect the bank to be unable to cover all early withdrawals. A deposit insurance financed through taxes on depositors (who are owners of mutual banks) prevents bank runs. Since banks offer deposit contracts that implement the ex-ante optimal allocation (c 1 , c 2 ) with consumption by early withdrawal strictly less than consumption by late withdrawal, c 1 < c 2 , deposit guarantees need not be promised with certainty. Indeed, any bailout probability z ∈ 
Conclusions
Regulatory ambiguity and political opacity have been for a long time being in the center of economic debates. The common approach to the issue is representing an opaque regulatory policy with a probability distribution over its possible realizations.
This approach fails to capture possible heterogeneity of beliefs of uninformed agents.
If the policy of the regulator is not announced, the public estimates the likelihood of the future outcomes according to their degrees of pessimism or optimism. Even if the public are homogenous in their ambiguity attitude, they can form different beliefs, if the regulation has an asymmetric impact on them.
In the current paper, regulatory ambiguity is studied in the market equilibrium framework. It is shown that even if agents are perfectly rational and symmetrically informed about each other, as well as about the macroeconomic environment, some missing piece of information can play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium outcome. The fact that the regulator is better informed about his policy than the public, does not create a problem of asymmetric information, since the regulator does not participate in the market interactions. If the perfectly rational public are informed about the objective function of the regulator, they may wish to find the optimal regulatory policy, which they would count for in their decision-making. However, if there are multiple optima, the public have to make decisions under ambiguity.
Regulatory ambiguity is studied here in application to the deposit market. An ambiguous bailout policy creates an asymmetry in beliefs of depositors and bankers with regards to the action of the regulator in case of banks' insolvency. This may result in a suboptimal allocation of funds as compared with the market outcome. Informing agents about the probability of bailouts eliminates the asymmetry in beliefs and restores the optimal allocation of funds. This result provides a reason for limiting the "constructive ambiguity" to a stochastic bailout rule with a probability of bailouts known to both bankers and depositors. If the regulator cannot communicate a stochastic bailout policy to the public, a possible way to achieve efficiency is to condition the bailout policy on a publicly observed macroeconomic parameter with known probability distribution. This parameter then plays the role of a publicly observed randomizer that aligns beliefs of the public.
The inefficiency result is more likely for economies (or time periods) with high aggregate investment risk and high internalization of bailout/liquidation costs by banks (penalty on bankers). If the regulator cannot credibly signal about his policy, and as a result the beliefs of the public cannot align, efficient equilibria still can be ensured, if the internalization of bailout costs by banks is low and aggregate investment risk is low. This comparative static exercise is in line with the observations from the recent financial crisis. In the pre-crisis environment with lower aggregate risk underinvestment was not an issue and constructive ambiguity did not seem to create a problem. The crisis has contributed to the aggregate investment risk and generated a wave of debates on "social responsibility" of bankers leading to increased penalties for bankers. As the model predicts, these two factors combined with an ambiguous bailout policy lead to underinvestment in the real sector. Although there are many other factors that contribute to underinvestment, the objective of the current paper was to draw attention to the one which importance seemingly has been underestimated in the "goldilocks economy": some negative effects of political ambiguity can only be seen in times of high aggregate risk.
